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The determinants of exchange rate dynamics are a central focus of research in open
economy macroeconomics. In the goods market, changes in export and import ﬂows can
induce exchange rate adjustment when tradeables prices are sticky. In the assets market,
a positive domestic-foreign interest rate diﬀerential causes exchange rate appreciation to
equilibrate real returns across countries. The Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model embeds
this dual role of the exchange rate, generating the famous exchange rate overshooting
result in response to monetary policy shocks.
Although theory predicts a systematic relationship between monetary policy and the
exchange rate, the empirical evidence is weak. Eichenbaum and Evans [1995] ﬁnd a
typical delay of three years in the maximum response of bilateral US$ exchange rates
to US interest rate shocks, a phenomenon since known as delayed overshooting.1 Chen
and Rogoﬀ [2003] document a weak eﬀect of interest rate diﬀerentials on exchange rates
even after controlling for commodity prices, while Grilli and Roubini [1996] ﬁnd that
contractionary monetary policy in non-US G7 countries induces exchange rate depre-
ciation rather than appreciation. These ﬁndings are not only at odds with standard
models of the exchange rate, but also challenge theoretical results that assume a link
between monetary policy and the exchange rate. For example, the Rogoﬀ [1985] result
that international monetary policy cooperation can reduce total welfare depends on dif-
ferences in the impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate across cooperative and
non-cooperative regimes. In related work, Guender and McCaw [2000] apply a standard
monetary model of the exchange rate to show that the inﬂationary bias associated with
discretionary monetary policy is negatively related to the elasticity of output supply with
respect to the real exchange rate, lending support to Romer’s [1993] empirical ﬁnding of
a negative openness-inﬂation relationship.
We argue that endogenous and anticipated movements in interest rates lead to down-
1All interest rates throughout the paper are nominal, overnight inter-bank rates. For the US, the
relevant interest rate is the federal funds rate.
1ward bias in the estimated eﬀect of monetary policy on the exchange rate.2 Endogenous
movements in interest rates result from changes in economic conditions. For example,
during a business cycle expansion, output is high, shifting out money demand and boost-
ing the federal funds rate. However, the economic expansion also typically raises expected
inﬂation, which creates pressure for a nominal depreciation in order to stabilise the real
exchange rate. This oﬀsets the appreciation caused by a positive interest rate diﬀeren-
tial, leading to a dampened exchange rate response to the federal funds rate. Anticipated
movements in the interest rate occur when the monetary authority responds to forecasts
concerning future economic conditions. Foreign exchange market traders often predict
such policy interventions and adjust their portfolios in advance, generating an exchange
rate adjustment before a change in interest rates takes place. A regression of the ex-
change rate on current and past interest rates will then indicate a weak relationship
between monetary policy and the exchange rate, despite the existence of an underlying
causal relationship.
In an investigation of the eﬀect of US monetary policy upon output and prices in
the closed economy, Romer and Romer [2004] employ the narrative approach to identify
monetary policy shocks in an attempt to overcome the endogeneity and anticipatory
biases. By analysing the minutes and transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings, they identify the Federal Reserve’s intended changes in the federal
funds rate, thereby eliminating interest rate changes that are endogenous to current
economic conditions. The intended interest rate changes are then regressed upon the
Federal Reserve’s output, inﬂation and unemployment forecasts. The residuals from this
regression are thus purged of anticipatory movements, forming an exogenous monetary
policy shock measure. Romer and Romer show that the narrative-approach identiﬁed
monetary policy shocks exert larger and faster eﬀects on industrial production and the
producer price index than the actual federal funds rate.
We examine the response of six bilateral US$ exchange rates to the Romer and Romer
2We speciﬁcally focus on monetary policy shocks as embodied by interest rate changes, but the general
identiﬁcation problem exists for other shock measures.
2monetary policy shock measure, employing both single equation models and vector au-
toregressions (VARs).3 The results show that the time until the maximum exchange rate
response is often less than half that observed using the actual federal funds rate, and
averages just 12.5 months in the case of the VAR estimates. Such time lags are easier
to explain as a consequence of adjustment costs, investor uncertainty, bounded rational-
ity and/or learning than are the previously estimated lags. For example, Lewis (1989a,
1989b) proposed agent learning as a possible source of delayed exchange rate adjustment.
We also ﬁnd that the maximum appreciation induced by a policy contraction is up to
2.5 times larger when using the Romer and Romer exogenous monetary policy measure
rather than the federal funds rate. This suggests that a failure to properly address en-
dogenous and anticipated interest rate movements accounts for some of the perplexing
exchange rate dynamics found in previous empirical work.
Our results from open economy VARs also provide new evidence on price and output
adjustment in the United States. Romer and Romer [2004] estimated larger and faster
monetary policy eﬀects on output and prices, but found that the maximum output re-
sponse and price adjustment commencement occurred at 24 months. Cochrane [2004]
argues that such lags are diﬃcult to reconcile with economic theory. By placing the US
in an open economy VAR, we ﬁnd that the median delay in the maximum eﬀect of an
exogenous monetary policy shock on output is just 14 months. Price adjustment begins
within one year, and within two years is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and often more than
half the adjustment observed at 48 months. We argue that the faster eﬀects of monetary
policy in the open economy VAR suggest a signiﬁcant adjustment role for the exchange
rate, which is neglected in the closed economy VARs.4
The VAR results also cast some light on the international transmission of US monetary
policy. Replicating Kim’s [2001] ﬁnding, an increase in the actual US interest rate measure
3We consider US exchange rates vis-` a-vis the other member states of the G7: Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom (UK).
4New open economy macroeconomy models stress the exchange rate’s adjustment role in the open
economy [Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995, 1996]. The ‘exchange-rate disconnect puzzle’ (deﬁned as the weak
estimated relationship between the exchange rate and any macroeconomic variables) represents an im-
portant challenge to these models [Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2001].
3elicits only small increases in foreign interest rates, excepting Canada. In contrast, Romer
and Romer’s monetary policy shock measure generates statistically signiﬁcant increases
in foreign interest rates in all G7 countries, excepting the UK. The stronger international
transmission of US monetary policy shocks is reﬂected in foreign output, which in 4/6
cases traces out a more pronounced U-shape than that observed following a shock to the
actual federal funds rate.
We carry out a series of robustness tests. Mirroring Romer and Romer’s closed econ-
omy ﬁndings, the results remain even after the inclusion of commodity prices in the open
economy VAR. This suggests that endogeneity and anticipatory biases in the estimated
eﬀects of monetary policy arise from sources other than supply shocks. The results are
also robust to the inclusion of a time trend, altering the lag structure and estimating the
model over diﬀerent sub-samples. Furthermore, our general conclusions are invariant to
using the reduced form impulse responses for inference or to changing the placement of
the monetary policy shock measure in the VAR ordering. This suggests that the Romer
and Romer monetary policy measure is truly exogenous in the VAR.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review theoretical and empir-
ical work on monetary policy and the exchange rate, focusing in particular on diﬀerent
approaches to monetary policy shock identiﬁcation. We argue that the Romer and Romer
[2004] monetary policy measure meets the requirements of an exogenous monetary pol-
icy shock set out in the theoretical literature, allowing for an accurate assessment of
monetary policy’s impact on the exchange rate. In section 3, we describe our empirical
methodology and the data employed. Then, in section 4, we present the empirical results
from the single equation and VAR models. We explore the robustness of our ﬁndings in
section 5, and conclude with a brief summary and discussion in section 6.
42 Monetary policy and the exchange rate
In this section, we ﬁrst present a brief review of how monetary policy is connected to the
exchange rate in theory. Then, we discuss the various approaches that have previously
been applied to identify monetary policy shocks and to evaluate their impact on the
exchange rate. Finally, we consider Romer and Romer’s [2004] narrative approach to
monetary policy shock identiﬁcation, explaining how this generates identiﬁcation in the
open economy context.
2.1 The Identiﬁcation of Monetary Shocks: Theory and Prac-
tice
A simple Cagan-style model implies that the level of the exchange rate at a moment in
time is the discounted inﬁnite sum of expected future Home and Foreign money supplies
(e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). The classic Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch (MFD) model
(see Dornbusch, 1976) generates a similar result.5 In this model, an unexpected monetary
expansion requires that the price level increase and the nominal exchange rate depreciate
in equal proportion, to preserve the real equilibrium. In the short-run when prices are
sticky, real interest rates fall below world levels. In order to satisfy the uncovered interest
parity (UIP) condition (a no-arbitrage condition requiring that interest rate diﬀerentials
today be oﬀset by expected future currency movements), the nominal exchange rate must
overshoot its long-run level such that there is an expected short-run appreciation. If the
shift in monetary policy is permanent, the exchange rate will settle at its long-run level
once prices adjust, while if the shift is temporary the exchange rate will return to its
pre-shock level.6
These models highlight two points that are especially relevant to empirical work on
monetary policy and the exchange rate. Firstly, since money supply shocks are related
5Dornbusch’s original [1976] paper is a perfect foresight model. This is easily generalized to allow for
a stochastic money supply as the model is log-linear.
6See Sarno and Taylor [2002] for an excellent summary of the literature on exchange rate determina-
tion, including micro-founded models.
5to the interest rate via money demand, changes in interest rates represent an alternative
measure of monetary policy shocks. Indeed, Bernanke and Blinder [1992] argue that
the federal funds rate is a better measure of US monetary policy than quantity-based
measures, such as non-borrowed reserves. This is because movements in quantity-based
measures are more likely to reﬂect endogenous changes in money demand, rather than
exogenous monetary policy actions.7 Secondly, monetary shocks should be unanticipated.
If shocks are anticipated, the largest exchange rate response likely occurs at the time at
which the information arrives and not at the time of the shock. The full eﬀect of monetary
policy on the exchange rate will then be diﬃcult to identify empirically.
Empirical studies of exchange rate dynamics typically involve ﬁtting a vector autore-
gression (VAR) for a small system of open economy variables.8 Identiﬁcation is then
achieved by imposing a set of restrictions that map the reduced form shocks to structural
shocks. For example, the structural shock associated with the interest rate equation in
the VAR is interpreted as the unanticipated shift in policy implemented by the monetary
authority.
The most common restrictions employed are short-run restrictions on the contempo-
raneous linkages between variables, as determined by the chosen Wold causal chain in
a recursive VAR.9 The canonical open economy example of such an identiﬁcation ap-
proach is Eichenbaum and Evans’ [1995] paper. They ﬁt a VAR for US output and
prices, foreign output and foreign interest rates, a measure of non-borrowed reserves, the
US federal funds rate and the nominal dollar exchange rate (foreign variables are drawn
from one of the other six G7 countries). The monetary policy shock is equated with
an orthogonal innovation to either the US federal funds rate or non-borrowed reserves.
Eichenbaum and Evans ﬁnd various ‘anomalies’ in the estimated impulse responses. The
bilateral US$ exchange rate’s peak response often occurs with a lag of three years. Such
7The Volcker experiment from 1979-1981 represents an exception to this principle. In section 5.3, we
discuss the consequences of including or excluding this period in the empirical analysis.
8An exception is the study by Bonser-Neal et al. [1998], which we discuss in section 2.2.
9The Wold causal chain is reﬂected in the ordering of the variables in a recursive VAR, as this order
aﬀects the Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix [Sims, 1980].
6delayed overshooting is diﬃcult to reconcile with the MFD model, which requires that
the exchange rate act as a jump variable. The delayed overshoot also implies a forward
premium anomaly, in that expected exchange rate movements magnify the excess returns
available on US assets following an increase in interest rates. Eichenbaum and Evans also
explore the robustness of their ﬁndings to the inclusion of the Romer and Romer 1989
monetary contraction dummy. Their general conclusions remain, although with a larger
estimated response and larger associated standard error.10
Kim and Roubini [2000] argue that the short-run restrictions implied by a recursive
identiﬁcation scheme are likely invalid for the open economy.11 Instead, Kim and Roubini
employ restrictions on the monetary authority’s reaction function to identify monetary
policy shocks.12 The resulting impulse response lines show fewer instances of delayed
overshooting following federal funds rate shocks. However, bilateral US$ exchange rates
continue to show perverse dynamics. Moreover, the maximum response is often small.13
Bernanke and Mihov [1998] identify monetary policy shocks by modelling the Federal
Reserve’s operating procedures in the context of a VAR. The resulting ‘semi-structural’
VAR allows for an endogenous Federal Reserve reaction to current reserve market con-
ditions, thereby enabling the extraction of a more exogenous monetary shock. From this
framework, they construct a measure of the overall monetary policy stance. Kalyvitis
and Michaelides [2001] take the Bernanke-Mihov overall monetary policy stance measure
and include it in a 5-variable open economy VAR, in addition to the short-term interest
10Blomberg [2001] extends this exercise by developing a reﬁnement of Romer and Romer [1989]’s
narrative approach, coding the shock dummy to include expansions. Using daily data, he investigates
the out-of-sample performance of a single equation ARX model of the exchange rate which includes both
the federal funds rate and the reﬁned monetary shock dummy. The ARX model inclusive of the reﬁned
monetary shock dummy performs better (up to an 11% lower root-mean-square-error) than a random
walk forecast of the exchange rate for the one to ten-day horizons.
11For example, a Wold causal chain implies that either interest rates may aﬀect exchange rates contem-
poraneously or exchange rates may aﬀect interest rates, but not both simultaneously. A richer two-way
interdependency seems plausible.
12Cushman and Zha [1997] undertake a similar structural VAR identiﬁcation strategy, arguing that
the monetary authority’s reaction function includes foreign variables. They implement the model for
Canada, resolving its exchange rate puzzle (deﬁned as an exchange rate depreciation response to a
domestic interest rate increase).
13The maximum appreciation of the dollar across six bilateral rates following a 105 basis point increase
in the federal funds rate is 1.9%, while the smallest is 0.6%. See Kim and Roubini [2000], Figure 4.
7rate diﬀerential.14 Kalyvitis and Michaelides contend that traditional VAR-based mone-
tary policy shock measures fail to consider changes in the Federal Reserve’s chosen target
(e.g., interest rates or reserves). The Bernanke-Mihov measure implicitly allows for the
target to switch, by combining information on the policy stance towards the interest
rate and reserves. Kalyvitis and Michaelides ﬁnd some evidence for immediate exchange
rate overshooting, but a number of puzzles remain. For example, following a monetary
contraction in the US, the dominant response of dollar exchange rates versus the French
franc and the British pound is depreciation rather than appreciation.
Faust and Rogers [2003] investigate how the estimated impulse responses in open
economy VARs change as the recursive identiﬁcation assumptions are relaxed. They
bound the likely impulse responses by assuming only partial identiﬁcation.15 Delayed
overshooting of the exchange rate is less severe when a contemporaneous eﬀect of US
interest rates on foreign interest rates is allowed. However, the explanatory power of US
monetary policy for bilateral US$ exchange rates against the UK pound and the German
mark is typically small in such cases.16
We argue that endogenous and anticipated movements in the federal funds rate con-
tribute to the generally weak relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate
that has been documented in the previous literature. As discussed in the introduction,
interest rate movements need not originate with the monetary authority and may instead
arise endogenously, in response to economic conditions. For example, during cyclical ex-
pansions output is high and this may shift out the money demand curve, boosting the
federal funds rate. At the same time, the upswing in the business cycle likely increases
expected inﬂation. While the higher federal funds rate may appreciate the exchange rate,
the associated increase in expected inﬂation creates pressure for a nominal depreciation
14Their Wold ordering is
￿￿






′, which is relative output, relative
prices, the Bernanke-Mihov measure, the interest rate diﬀerential, and the exchange rate.
15For example, the partial identiﬁcation assumptions may take the form of sign restrictions, as opposed
to contemporaneous exclusion restrictions. See Uhlig [2005] for a recent application of this strategy in
the closed economy context. He ﬁnds little eﬀect of monetary policy upon output.
16An alternative set of identifying assumptions is provided by long-run neutrality conditions. See Faust
and Leeper [1997]. This approach has rarely been followed in open economy VARs.
8in order to stabilise the real exchange rate. This dampens the exchange rate appreciation
and may even cause a net depreciation. Alternatively, consider a case where exchange
rate depreciation causes an increase in expected inﬂation, and thus nominal interest rates.
Increases in nominal interest rates will then be correlated with exchange rate deprecia-
tion, contrary to what theories of monetary policy predict.17 To measure the full impact
of monetary policy on the exchange rate, it is important to identify shocks that arise
solely from the intentions of the monetary authority.
When the monetary authority responds to expected future events, monetary policy
may be anticipated. Consider a scenario in which the Federal Reserve’s forecasts indicate
higher output and inﬂation over the next year. In response, the Federal Reserve raises
interest rates. If agents have at least some of the Federal Reserve’s information and
anticipate its interest rate response, agents may adjust their portfolios at the time at
which information underpinning the forecast becomes known. Thus, the dollar moves in
advance of the federal funds rate and the relationship between these variables estimated
from a backward-looking VAR will be biased downwards.18 A proper accounting of the
impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate therefore also requires that unanticipated
shocks be isolated.
As is clear from the earlier discussion, previous research has typically used either re-
cursive or structural VAR restrictions in attempting to eliminate endogenous and antici-
pated federal funds rate movements. These identiﬁcation schemes extract shocks through
orthogonalising the residuals of the federal funds rate equation with respect to other resid-
ual series in the VAR. However, unless the VAR contains all variables which may shift
money demand (e.g., measures of ﬁnancial sector regulatory reform; asset prices such as
those for housing and equity, etc.), then this identiﬁcation scheme will fail to eliminate
17This arises from the failure to distinguish between changes in real interest rates and changes in
expected inﬂation when nominal interest rate changes are used as monetary policy measures.
18Such behaviour appears commonplace. For example, a headline story on the Bloomberg news website
on June 16th 2005 read: ‘The dollar rose for the fourth day in ﬁve against the euro in London on expec-
tations a Federal Reserve report today will show manufacturing growth accelerated in the Philadelphia
region ... reinforcing speculation the Fed will raise interest rates for a ninth time in a year on June 30.’
9the entire endogenous component.19 Similarly, without the inclusion of forecasts of the
economy’s future direction, the anticipated component of interest rate movements will
not be removed from the VAR-identiﬁed shocks.20 We now turn to an alternative method
of shock identiﬁcation that tries to overcome these problems.
2.2 The narrative approach to shock identiﬁcation
The narrative approach to shock identiﬁcation uses historical documentation to identify
exogenous changes in monetary policy. The origins of the narrative approach date from
Friedman and Schwartz’s [1963] review of the monetary history of the United States.
Romer and Romer [1989] formalized the approach by analysing the minutes of Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings in order to determine the dates of exogenous
monetary policy contractions.
Recently, Romer and Romer [2004] (henceforth R&R) have further reﬁned the nar-
rative approach by means of a two-step procedure applied to the United States’ Federal
Reserve Bank’s monetary policy over the period 1969-1996.21 In the ﬁrst step, the nar-
rative evidence is used to determine the size of the federal funds rate change targeted
by the Federal Reserve. This eliminates endogenous interest rate movements linked to
current economic conditions.22 In the second step, the targeted interest rate change is
purged of anticipated changes. R&R accomplish this by regressing the targeted inter-
est rate change upon the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook (in-house) forecasts of inﬂation,
output and unemployment over horizons of up to six months.23 The residuals from this
19Leeper et al. [1996] are able to include several such variables in their VAR study of US monetary
policy by applying Bayesian methods to avoid the problem of parameter proﬂigacy.
20Sims [1992] includes commodity prices in a VAR, as an ‘information variable’ that may predict future
inﬂation, while Barth III and Ramey [2002] include output and inﬂation forecasts directly. However,
both studies look at closed economy VARs.
21The procedure could readily be applied to other monetary authorities, contingent upon information
availability. It addresses many of the objections raised to the narrative approach pioneered in Romer
and Romer [1989].
22See Romer and Romer [2004] and the accompanying data appendix for full details.
23Inﬂation and output represent the central objective variables of the Federal Reserve. See Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve [2005], or the International Banking Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act).
10regression are the targeted interest rate changes which are orthogonal to the economy’s
expected time path.24 R&R obtain one observation per FOMC meeting and then convert
this time series to monthly data through summing the values for months in which more
than one meeting occurred.25 R&R show that this measure of monetary policy exerts an
eﬀect on output and prices that is both larger and faster than that associated with the
raw federal funds rate, suggesting that endogenous and anticipated movements in interest
rates distort the estimated eﬀects of monetary policy.26
We propose to use the R&R monetary policy shocks to estimate the eﬀects of mon-
etary policy in the open economy, focusing upon its impact on bilateral US$ exchange
rates. As this measure of monetary policy has been purged of endogenous and antici-
pated movements, it should exert a larger and faster eﬀect on exchange rates. One might
argue that in an open economy context, an exogenous measure of monetary policy should
be orthogonal to forecasts for future exchange rates, similar to the closed economy con-
text, where R&R orthogonalise intended changes in interest rates with respect to output,
inﬂation and unemployment forecasts. However, there are two arguments against such
an approach. Firstly, the Federal Reserve generally does not target exchange rates di-
rectly; eﬀective exchange rate forecasts are notoriously diﬃcult to formulate.27 Secondly,
exchange rates likely aﬀect Federal Reserve decisions via output, inﬂation and unemploy-
ment forecasts. For example, an over-valued dollar may reduce these forecasts and the
Federal Reserve will respond by cutting interest rates. However, this implies that the
appropriate second step in the construction of the R&R shock measure is exactly the one
undertaken by R&R: purge the targeted interest rate of output and inﬂation forecasts.28
24The Federal Reserve’s economic forecasts likely represent the best (most informative) expectations
of the economy’s future path. See Romer and Romer [2000].
25At present there are approximately 8 meetings per year but historically the ﬁgure has been higher.
In months in which there are no meetings, the shock measure is set to zero.
26R&R examine the response of the log of an industrial production index and the log producer price
index.
27This is famously articulated by Meese and Rogoﬀ [1983].
28This argument also provides some insurance against the source of bias identiﬁed by Grilli and Roubini
[1996]. They contend that the weak eﬀect of monetary policy on the exchange rate arises because increases
in the federal funds rate are a policy response to contemporaneous dollar depreciation. If the weaker
dollar feeds into output and inﬂation forecasts, its eﬀect on the target federal funds rate are removed by
the R&R procedure’s second step.
11It remains likely that some component of the R&R shock series is endogenous to current
and expected exchange rate behaviour. For example, if the Federal Reserve responds to
forecasts at horizons beyond 6 months, or if there are instances in which the Federal Re-
serve sets policy in response to concerns over the future value of the dollar (R&R discuss
a possible example of this during 1984/85), then some endogeneity and/or anticipatory
biases are introduced. The presence of such biases would weaken the estimated eﬀect
of monetary policy on the exchange rate. This suggests that the estimated eﬀect of the
R&R monetary policy measure on the exchange rate likely represents a lower bound on
the true eﬀect.29 Regardless, the R&R monetary policy measure is still likely free of
most endogenous and anticipated movements, and is thus an improvement over previous
measures in understanding the eﬀect of monetary policy on the exchange rate.
There have been previous attempts to address the endogeneity and anticipatory biases
which may arise when using the actual federal funds rate to measure monetary policy in
exchange rate studies. Bonser-Neal et al. [1998] argue that the actual federal funds rate
is a noisy measure of the Federal Reserve’s true monetary policy position, due to tem-
porary ﬂuctuations in the reserve market causing large movements in the actual federal
funds rate. Instead, they advocate the use of Rudebusch’s [1995] daily federal funds rate
target series as a monetary policy measure. Bonser-Neal et al. regress daily spot and
forward exchange rate changes upon contemporaneous changes in the target rate series.
They ﬁnd eﬀects of monetary policy which are consistent with overshooting. Further-
more, they argue that the inclusion of foreign exchange interventions as an explanatory
variable bolsters their ﬁndings. However, their econometric framework does not reveal
the dynamics of the exchange rate response, nor does it correct for anticipatory biases.
Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright [2003] address possible anticipatory bias in VAR-
identiﬁed monetary policy shock measures by deﬁning an unanticipated monetary policy
shock as the change in the federal funds rate from before the FOMC interest rate an-
29Including six impulse dummies, for months in the last quarter of 1984 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1985,
in the empirical models does not change our ﬁnding that the new monetary policy measure exerts more
powerful eﬀects on exchange rates. In some cases the results actually get stronger, indicating a small
amount of endogeneity of the R&R series with respect to the exchange rate.
12nouncement to just after the FOMC announcement. Using high frequency data, they
regress observed changes in the exchange rate and the prices of spot and three and six
month-forward federal funds rates’ futures on the change in the federal funds rate at the
time of the FOMC announcement. If exchange rates and asset prices embody market
expectations and if risk premia are constant, the ﬁtted values from such a regression give
the eﬀects of an unanticipated change in the federal funds rate at horizons of zero, three
and six months. Eichenbaum and Evans’ [1995] open economy VAR is then identiﬁed by
assuming that monetary policy replicates these eﬀects from the high frequency data re-
gressions. Focusing on Germany and the United Kingdom as the foreign economy, Faust
et al. ﬁnd fewer instances of delayed overshooting and a larger maximum exchange rate
response. However, they note that the results are imprecise and a possibly large and
persistent price puzzle (deﬁned as a positive response of prices to interest rates) remains.
The maintained assumptions of the Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright [2003] procedure
are that asset markets appropriately embody expectations, as is implied by the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis, and that risk premia do not change over time so that futures’ rate
changes reﬂect expected future spot rate changes.
The R&R [2004] monetary policy shocks represent an alternative which does not re-
quire these assumptions. Their validity instead hinges upon the appropriate interpreta-
tion of the narrative evidence and the Greenbook forecasts accounting for all anticipated
movements in interest rates. Furthermore, because they employ high frequency data
in the ﬁrst step, Faust et al. [2003] must use a shorter time series, beginning in 1994
and only including 62 FOMC meetings. By contrast, the R&R data include 272 FOMC
meetings and therefore bring more information to bear in identifying exogenous mone-
tary policy. In the next section, we describe the methods that we use to estimate the
response of bilateral exchange rates to the R&R monetary policy shocks and to assess
how exchange rate adjustment bears on price and output dynamics and the evolution of
foreign macroeconomic variables.
133 Econometric methodology and data
In order to gauge the impact of monetary policy on bilateral dollar exchange rates, we
estimate two sets of econometric models – single equation regressions and VARs. We
describe each in turn.
3.1 Single equation models
The single equation models estimated have the following general form:
















φlDl + εt (1)
where st is the (log) exchange rate measured as US dollars per foreign currency unit,
rus is either the actual federal funds rate (FF) or the cumulated R&R shocks measure
(RR), rf is the foreign interest rate and D is a seasonal (monthly) dummy.30 All interest
rates are measured in percentage points. The foreign country is one of the non-US G7
countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK. The data are monthly and
the sample period runs from the early 1970s to the end of 1996, though varying slightly
by country. See the appendix for tables containing the sample periods and variable
deﬁnitions and sources.
We include 24 lags of the dependent variable and 36 lags of each exogenous variable,
replicating the baseline structure in R&R [2004]. Contemporaneous interest rate eﬀects
are excluded; this is justiﬁed by R&R on the grounds that monetary policy may exert
a delayed eﬀect. Such an argument is less tenable in the case of the exchange rate, but
will be relaxed in the later VAR analysis, which allows for contemporaneous eﬀects from
the structural monetary policy shocks. Equation (1) is estimated by OLS. The exchange
rate’s dynamic response to a permanent 100 basis point shift in either FF or RR can then
be graphed and standard error bands computed via the delta method.31
30Seasonal dummies are included to control for possible seasonality. However, our results hold inde-
pendent of their inclusion.
31A permanent 100 basis point shift is simulated by assuming the sequence (..0, 0, 1, 0, 0, ..) for ∆rus
t .
143.2 VAR models
VAR models oﬀer some advantages in evaluating the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks.
Rather than causing a permanent change in the interest rate, interest rate shocks may
decay over time. Furthermore, the VAR endogenises the foreign interest rate, thus con-
trolling for exchange rate movements triggered by the foreign monetary authority. Hence,
the VAR permits experiments that more closely resemble those undertaken in theoretical
analysis.
We estimate the VAR analysed in Eichenbaum and Evans [1995] and revisited by
Faust and Rogers [2003] and Faust, Rogers, Swanson, and Wright [2003]. These studies
focus on the vector of variables [yus pus yf rf NBRX r s]
′, where yus is industrial
production in the US, pus is the US CPI, yf is foreign industrial production (price and
production series are logs of index numbers) and NBRX is the log ratio of non-borrowed
reserves to total reserves (other variables are deﬁned above). The VAR includes a full
set of monthly dummies and each variable enters with 12 lags. Previous estimates of this
7-variable VAR have typically used 6 lags, but we ﬁnd that this shorter lag structure leads
to residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. This problem is rectiﬁed by using the
more general lag structure.32 The inclusion of 12 or even 18 lags in VARs ﬁtted using
monthly data is not uncommon (e.g., Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).33
We follow Eichenbaum and Evans [1995] in assuming a recursive causal ordering: a
variable responds contemporaneously only to those variables placed higher in the VAR.
A Choleski decomposition is then used to retrieve the monetary policy shock for cases
in which the domestic interest rate is either (a) the actual federal funds rate; or (b)
the cumulated R&R shock measure. Note that the problems associated with recursive
identiﬁcation schemes discussed by Kim and Roubini [2000] and Faust and Rogers [2003]
are likely less severe in VARs in which the R&R variable is used. For example, the
assumption that monetary policy cannot respond to exchange rate shocks within a month
32The appendix provides a full set of residual diagnostic tests for the single equation and VAR models.
33In our robustness section, we discuss results based on VARs containing 6 lags.
15is thought unrealistic, but as the R&R variable has been purged of endogenous and
anticipated movements, it is more defensible.34
Before proceeding to the empirical results, there are two caveats. Firstly, the foreign
interest rate measures that we employ have not been purged of endogenous and antic-
ipated movements. This principally aﬀects the response of exchange rates to overseas
monetary policy shocks, which is not the focus of our analysis. However, to the extent
that these components of foreign interest rates correlate with the R&R shock measure,
the impulse responses associated with the latter may be aﬀected and this point should
be kept in mind throughout. Secondly, the R&R shock measure is a generated regressor,
while the standard errors that we report do not account for this fact. However, as Pagan
[1984] shows, hypothesis testing versus a null of no eﬀect is still valid.35
4 Empirical results
In Figures 1 and 2, we present the response of bilateral US dollar exchange rates to
100 basis point increases in the actual federal funds rate (FF) and the cumulated R&R
shock measure (RR). Figure 1 presents simulations based on the single equation models
in which the interest rate increase is permanent, while Figure 2 graphs results for a
temporary interest rate shock that dissipates according to the VAR dynamics. In Tables
1 and 2 we report the percentage deviation in the exchange rate (from its initial level)
that has maximum absolute value over 12 and 48 month horizons.36
In Figure 1, the dollar appreciation is generally larger and faster following a change in
RR. The response lines obtained for the dollar versus the Italian lira, the Japanese yen and
the British pound following an RR innovation are everywhere below the corresponding
34In our robustness section, we discuss the consequences of changing the causal ordering assumed by
Eichenbaum and Evans [1995].
35For comparison, we also calculated bootstrapped standard errors for the US-UK VAR, which do
correct for the presence of a generated regressor. Speciﬁcally, we employed a residual bootstrap with 500
replications. The bootstrapped and delta-method based standard errors are virtually identical, indicating
that hypothesis tests versus non-zero nulls are also likely valid.
36Positive numbers indicate appreciation and negative numbers depreciation.
16lines for FF. The same is almost true of dollar rates against the French franc and the
German mark. Only when measured against the Canadian dollar does the US$ exchange
rate show a smaller response to RR than to FF. In Table 1, we see that in the ﬁrst
year the largest appreciation of the dollar following a change in RR always exceeds that
obtained using FF, often by a factor of more than two. At the 48 month horizon, the
maximum appreciation induced by RR is larger than that induced by FF in 5/6 cases
(the Canadian dollar rate is the exception).
Turning to the VAR evidence, it can be seen that each monetary policy measure
exerts a smaller impact on the exchange rate than in the single equation case, reﬂecting
the fact that the shocks are temporary rather than permanent in this case. Diﬀerences
in the eﬀects of FF and RR are still clear. Excepting the case in which Canada is
the foreign country, the US dollar exchange rate traces out a more pronounced U-shape
following shocks to RR.37 Table 2 shows that short-run exchange rate responses to FF
are often perverse. For example, after a policy contraction, the dominant movement in
the ﬁrst year is depreciation in 3/6 cases. In contrast, the dominant eﬀect following
a shock to RR is appreciation in all cases. At the 48 month horizon, the maximum
appreciation induced by RR exceeds that induced by FF in all 6 cases, by a factor of
approximately 2 (US$/UK£, US$/FRF), 1.5 (US$/CN$, US$/GRM) and slightly more
than one (US$/JP¥, US$/IT₤).38
Table 2 shows that monetary policy exerts its maximum eﬀect on the exchange rate
with a signiﬁcantly shorter lag when measured using RR rather than FF. The average
time until the maximum appreciation is some 16.8 months less when RR is used in place
of FF. This means that the forward premium anomaly, which refers to the propensity
for exchange rate ﬂuctuations to reinforce the excess returns implied by interest rate
diﬀerentials, is much less persistent when RR is the monetary policy measure. However,
37The weak response of the US$/CN$ exchange rate appears to be due to Canadian interest rates
adjusting rapidly to US interest rates, so that interest rate diﬀerentials and the scope for exchange rate
adjustment are short-lived. The endogeneity of Canadian monetary policy with respect to US monetary
policy is conﬁrmed by other results reported later in this section.
38There is no marked improvement in the statistical signiﬁcance of the impulse responses, likely re-
ﬂecting RR’s lower sample variation.
17the absolute size of the forward premium anomaly increases in the short-run due to the
larger exchange rate changes observed in response to RR. On average, the maximum eﬀect
of RR occurs after just 12.5 months, and after less than one year in 3/6 cases. Such lags
in exchange rate adjustment are easier to explain in terms of adjustment costs, investor
uncertainty, bounded rationality or learning than are the long lags obtained using the
actual federal funds rate, which are at least 47 months in 3/6 cases. Such changes in the
timing of the exchange rate’s response demonstrate that the impulse responses to RR
are not merely vertically stretched versions of the impulse responses to FF. This would
occur if RR’s variance is smaller than that of FF but impulse responses were generated by
considering shocks of identical size (as opposed to variable-speciﬁc standard deviations).
Instead, the estimated exchange rate responses reﬂect a genuinely stronger reaction to
RR, especially during the ﬁrst two years after a shock.
We also calculated forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) following shocks
to both FF and RR. Although at the 12 month horizon RR explains a larger proportion
of exchange rate ﬂuctuations than does FF in 4/6 cases, the explanatory power of either
monetary policy measure is small. For example, RR explains at most 7% of exchange
rate ﬂuctuations at the 12 month horizon (the statistics for FF are even smaller). Hence,
while removing endogenous and anticipated movements in the federal funds rate leads to
larger and faster eﬀects of monetary policy on the exchange rate, exogenous movements
in monetary policy are not large enough to explain a substantial proportion of exchange
rate ﬂuctuations. This is consistent with ﬁndings from previous studies (e.g., Faust and
Rogers [2003]).39
4.1 Intermediate measures of monetary policy
In analysing the eﬀect of monetary policy on output and prices, R&R consider two
intermediate measures of monetary policy. DTARG is the change in the intended federal
funds rate identiﬁed from the narrative records, while DRESIDF is the residual series
39Full FEVD results are available upon request.
18obtained by regressing the change in the actual federal funds rate on the Greenbook
forecasts. These variables can be used directly in the single equation models, while their
cumulated values can be used in the VARs. The ﬁrst variable (TARG) measures the
intended stance of monetary policy, but is not orthogonal to forecasts of future economic
conditions. The second (RESIDF) removes anticipated policy changes, but may include
endogenous elements. In Figure 3, we present exchange rate responses to 100 basis point
increases in TARG and RESIDF from the single equation models, while in Figure 4
we present the evidence from VARs. Tables 3 and 4 present summary information on
maximum exchange rate responses at 12 and 48 month horizons.
The results indicate that neither the endogeneity or anticipatory biases alone explain
diﬀerences in the eﬀects of FF and RR. This is similar to the conclusions reached by R&R
regarding output and prices. However, a closer inspection of the results reveals some
intriguing regularities. The single equation models (Table 3) show that the appreciation
induced by TARG over the 48 month horizon exceeds that induced by RESIDF in 5/6
cases. Similarly, the VAR models (Table 4) show that the appreciation of the dollar
associated with TARG over the 48 month horizon is larger than that associated with
RESIDF (in 5/6 cases, it is larger than that associated with RR). Hence, a tentative
conclusion is that the correction for endogeneity embodied in TARG accounts for the
greater long-term magnitude of the RR eﬀects relative to the FF eﬀects.
Correcting for anticipated policy movements seems to drive the speed of exchange
rate adjustment. In the single equation models, the maximum exchange rate appreciation
associated with RESIDF during the ﬁrst 12 months generally occurs sooner than that
associated with TARG. During the ﬁrst 48 months, a maximum is always reached sooner
using RESIDF. The results from VAR models indicate no clear pattern in response speeds
at the 12 month horizon. Over 48 months, the maximum appreciation occurs with a
shorter lag when using RESIDF in all cases except that in which Canada is the foreign
country.
194.2 Price and output responses
The responses of the price level and output to FF and RR shocks are evaluated by R&R,
but there are at least two reasons for revisiting the subject here. Firstly, most of the
evidence presented by R&R is based on single equation models. When VARs are used,
they include only three variables (output, prices and interest rates), and incorporate 36
lags, many more than the number usually considered in the literature. The open economy
VARs considered here are richer and more typical of the literature. Secondly, and more
importantly, the open economy VARs may cast some light on the channels through which
exogenous monetary policy shocks inﬂuence prices and output.40
In Figure 5, we present impulse response functions for the US CPI.41 The maximum
price eﬀects obtained using both FF and RR are smaller than those reported by R&R,
reﬂecting the fact that richer VAR speciﬁcations condition out many of the factors un-
derpinning a high unconditional correlation between RR and the CPI (a similar result is
obtained for the output responses below). The important feature of the results is the im-
pact of RR relative to that of FF. A positive FF shock ﬁrst leads to a persistent increase
in consumer prices. This is the price puzzle documented by Sims [1992]. In contrast, any
price puzzle associated with RR is small and is always eliminated within a few months.
The expected decline in the CPI then begins within a year. After 24 months (the time at
which downward price adjustment begins in the R&R analysis), the reduction in prices
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and is between one half and two thirds the total change ob-
served after four years. Hence, in the open economy VAR, using an exogenous measure
of monetary policy not only ensures that a prolonged price puzzle is avoided, but also
greatly reduces the delay in the deﬂationary eﬀects of contractionary monetary policy.
This ﬁnding is important because it suggests that theoretical models intended to explain
delays in the deﬂationary eﬀects of monetary contractions (e.g., Barth III and Ramey,
40See Frankel and Chinn [1995] and Guender and McCaw [2000] for theoretical models in which the
exchange rate inﬂuences price and output adjustment.
41R&R employ the US producer price index, but show that their results are robust to the use of a
consumer expenditure deﬂator, which is very similar to the CPI.
202002) need only generate delays of 6-12 months rather than 24 months.
A possible interpretation is that pass-through from exchange rates to consumer prices
is a channel through which monetary policy contractions reduce prices.42 The exchange
rate channel is not explicitly modelled in Romer and Romer’s empirical application. When
monetary policy-induced exchange rate movements are correlated with other sources of
exchange rate ﬂuctuations, such as those due to foreign interest rates and foreign output,
the importance of the exchange rate channel may be understated. There is omitted
variable bias, leading to delayed US price adjustment in the VAR. By including the
exchange rate in the VAR system, the exchange rate’s dynamic response is disentangled
from the other variables in the VAR, potentially accounting for the quicker price response
observed in the open economy VAR.
Figure 6 presents impulse response functions for US industrial production. Except
for the VAR versus Canada, the maximum eﬀect of RR exceeds that of FF by a factor
ranging from more than 2 (France) to just 1.1 (Italy/Germany). These ﬁndings conﬁrm
the conclusions drawn by R&R from a 3-variable VAR with 36 lags. The most striking
feature of the results in Figure 6 is the increased speed with which monetary policy takes
eﬀect when measured using RR. Cochrane [2004] argues that the 24 month delay in the
maximum eﬀect of interest rates on output estimated by R&R is problematic because
theoretical models are generally unable to explain such lags. In the open economy VARs
that we estimate, the mean delay in the maximum eﬀect of RR on output is just 12.3
months, less than half the equivalent statistic for FF, and less than the lags estimated
by R&R. Furthermore, following an increase in RR, output always returns to equilibrium
within 3 years, and sometimes within 2 years, again pointing to much faster adjustment.
As in the case of prices, these results may reﬂect the role of the exchange rate in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
In Figure 7, we present impulse responses for the CPI following shocks to TARG
42The degree of such pass-through likely varies across countries, reﬂecting diﬀerences in pricing strate-
gies by foreign exporters in their respective markets, as well as diﬀerences in the extent to which each of
the foreign countries trades with the US.
21and RESIDF. The eﬀects of TARG resemble those of FF whilst the eﬀects of RESIDF
resemble those of RR. Following a shock to RESIDF, a sustained fall in the CPI starts
after less than 12 months in most cases, matching the eﬀects of RR. In contrast, TARG
yields a persistent price puzzle similar to that associated with FF. However, the maximum
eﬀect of RESIDF on the CPI is two to three times smaller than the maximum eﬀect of
RR, suggesting that the correction for endogenous policy movements associated with
TARG is important in explaining the size of the ﬁnal eﬀect induced by RR. Figure 8
provides impulse response functions for output following shocks to TARG and RESIDF.
There are three points to note. Firstly, the unexpected increase in output following
an increase in interest rates is statistically signiﬁcant when TARG is used but is small
and insigniﬁcant when RESIDF is used. Secondly, the maximum eﬀect of RESIDF on
industrial production always occurs with a shorter lag than the maximum eﬀect of TARG.
Thirdly, in 5/6 cases the impact of TARG on industrial production eventually exceeds
that of RESIDF. Hence, as was true of exchange rate adjustment, price and output
adjustment are consistent with the view that corrections embodied in RESIDF account
for the increased speed with which RR takes eﬀect, while the corrections embodied in
TARG account for the greater magnitude of the eﬀects of RR.
4.3 Foreign adjustment to US monetary policy shocks
In Figures 9 and 10, we present the response of foreign interest rates and foreign industrial
production to FF and RR. Foreign interest rates show a stronger response to movements
in RR in 4/6 cases and the diﬀerences involved are large, for example in the ﬁrst year
the response of French interest rates to RR is more than three times the response to FF.
Exceptions are found for Italian interest rates, which respond in equal measure to FF
and RR, and for UK interest rates, which appear more closely linked to FF.43 However,
43The UK evidence appears to depend on interest rate movements through the early 1980s. Fitting
a model with a sample that begins in 1982:6 yields an impulse response for UK interest rates that is
positive for the ﬁrst 7 months following a shock to RR. This is marginally bigger than those associated
with FF.
22the broad picture is that foreign interest rates respond more strongly to RR than to FF.
Purging the data of endogenous and anticipated interest rate changes suggests a stronger
international propagation of US monetary policy.
It is interesting to note that the maximum response of foreign interest rates to RR
always occurs within 12 months (and often within 6 months), which is a shorter lag
than that observed for the maximum exchange rate response. This suggests that initial
movements in foreign interest rates are a direct response to US monetary policy, as
opposed to a response to the depreciation of the exchange rate (from a foreign country
perspective).
The behaviour of foreign interest rates is relevant to understanding exchange rate
dynamics. Recall that the US$/CN$ exchange rate is the least responsive to monetary
policy. One reason for this appears to be the endogeneity of Canadian interest rates, which
move more than one-for-one with innovations to RR. Interest rate diﬀerentials between
the US and Canada are relatively small and short-lived. Therefore, the exchange rate
between these two countries adjusts very little in response to monetary policy.44 A further
striking feature of the foreign interest rate response to RR is that the lines always turn
negative at horizons of more than one year. Such periods of relatively low foreign interest
rates may contribute to the larger appreciations of the US dollar observed following shocks
to RR. However, it is not clear that this is a central channel in exchange rate adjustment.
The largest reduction in foreign interest rates occurs in Canada, but it is against the
Canadian dollar that the US dollar appreciates the least.45
The impulse responses for foreign output indicate that in 5/6 cases, RR induces larger
foreign recessions than FF. This suggests that the negative eﬀect on foreign output from
interest rate pass-through dominates the positive eﬀect from increased competitiveness of
foreign exports following appreciation of the US dollar. The recession is largest in Canada,
the country that initially raises interest rates most and sees its currency depreciate least.
44Interest rate pass-through is also large in the case of France, but takes much longer than in the
Canadian case.
45A richer foreign interest rate reaction function speciﬁcation (e.g., including foreign prices) might
clarify the channel.
23The tendency for Canadian and UK output to end up signiﬁcantly above zero after four
years is due to the negative eﬀect of RR on Canadian and UK interest rates at long
horizons.
Finally, in Figures 11 and 12, we present impulse response functions for foreign interest
rates and foreign output following shocks to TARG and RESIDF. Both variables appear
to respond more strongly to changes in TARG, the intended level of interest rates, than
to RESIDF, thus matching the ﬁndings for US macroeconomic variables. However, there
is no clear evidence that responses to RESIDF are faster than those to TARG, suggesting
that anticipatory bias is not crucial in explaining the weak international transmission of
FF shocks. One explanation is that foreign monetary authorities respond to anticipated
movements in US monetary policy after they have been implemented rather than be-
fore. The US may act as a leader in setting world interest rates, with foreign monetary
authorities following.46
5 Robustness
We now investigate the robustness of our results. The ﬁrst issue that we address is
whether or not the main ﬁndings hold in VARs that include further controls. Sims [1992]
notes that increases in commodity prices often eventually cause inﬂation episodes. Thus,
a commodity price index can act as an ‘information variable’ which controls for any as-
sociated preemptive moves in policy rates. The extended VAR that we estimate includes
the log level of the commodity price index from the IMF’s International Financial Statis-
tics and used by R&R in their single equation robustness analysis. The commodity price
term is included as the fourth variable in the VAR – commodity prices may respond to
US industrial production and US consumer prices contemporaneously, but only respond
to lagged ﬁnancial market variables. This ordering reﬂects the approach taken by Kim
[2001]. In Figure 13, we present impulse responses for bilateral dollar exchange rates
46Chinn and Frankel [2003] show that US interest rates drive European interest rates, but report only
weak evidence of causation in the opposite direction.
24following orthogonal innovations to FF and RR. The maximum eﬀect of RR on bilateral
dollar exchange rates always arises more quickly than that of FF. The diﬀerence in the
magnitude of the FF and RR eﬀects is generally smaller than those obtained from the
baseline models, particularly when Germany is the foreign country. However the diﬀer-
ences remain large in the other cases. For example, when the UK is the overseas country
the dollar appreciation in response to RR is 2.5 times the appreciation in response to FF.
In Figure 14, we present CPI responses for the extended VAR models. Controlling for
commodity prices provides only a very partial resolution of the price puzzle associated
with FF. Furthermore, the contrast with the reductions in the CPI in response to inno-
vations in RR remains striking – the latter are large, fast and highly signiﬁcant. Figure
15 presents the new impulse responses for US output. The maximum eﬀect of RR occurs
with a much shorter delay than the maximum eﬀect of FF, and the magnitude of the RR
eﬀect relative to the FF eﬀect is actually larger than in the baseline VARs.
In Figures 16 and 17, we present impulse responses for foreign interest rates and foreign
industrial production respectively. The results are largely similar to those obtained from
the baseline VARs (Figures 9 and 10). The response of Italian interest rates to RR
innovations is slightly smaller than in Figure 9 and the UK results remain puzzling.
However, interest rate pass-through exceeds unity for Canada and France and is greater
than 0.5 for Germany and Japan. These results contrast with Kim’s [2001] ﬁnding that
only Canadian interest rates respond to the US federal funds rate when commodity prices
are held constant.
A second extension of the information set in the baseline VAR that we considered was
the addition of a time trend to each equation. Giordani [2004] shows that the removal
of the underlying trend from variables such as output alters the results from VARs, such
that the price puzzle disappears. The inclusion of a time trend also absorbs much of the
non-stationarity in the data and as such represents an interesting robustness check. Full
results from this experiment are available upon request. The larger and faster eﬀects
of RR relative to FF generally remain for all variables. In the VAR in which Germany
25is the foreign country, the diﬀerence in the speed of exchange rate responses narrows
somewhat, although the relative size of the maximum responses increases. The price
puzzle associated with FF typically disappears, except in those cases in which Canada
and the UK are the foreign country. This reﬂects the Giordani [2004] result. In all cases
however, the greater speed and magnitude of the RR eﬀect on prices remain intact.
5.1 An alternative VAR ordering
Faust and Rogers [2003] criticise the recursive ordering used by Eichenbaum and Evans
because it assumes that overseas monetary authorities do not respond contemporaneously
to Federal Reserve decisions. To judge the sensitivity of our results to Eichenbaum and
Evans’ ordering, we also estimated VARs based on the vector [y
us pus yf r rf NBRX
s]
′, allowing for a contemporaneous eﬀect of US interest rates on foreign interest rates.
To save space, we simply note the key ﬁndings from the impulse responses.47 The size
of the responses of exchange rates and other macro variables to RR shocks remain intact
under the alternative ordering, and if anything are slightly larger than those documented
in section 4. The lags in the maximum eﬀects of monetary policy increase slightly, but
remain shorter than those obtained using the actual federal funds rate.
We also experimented with the ordering [r yus pus yf rf NBRX s]
′. This assumes
that US interest rates are the least endogenous variable in the system, which is true if
one accepts that the R&R procedure yields truly exogenous monetary policy shocks, and
allows for a non-zero contemporaneous eﬀect of monetary policy on each of the other
variables. The results are similar to those just described – magnitudes increase but there
is some small reduction in speed. Finally, we obtained impulse responses through not
imposing any recursive ordering and simply shocking the estimated reduced form. The
key features of the responses to RR are virtually unchanged, reﬂecting the fact that this
variable represents exogenous monetary policy shocks identiﬁed outside the model. The
responses to FF show some changes in shape and magnitude, but the contrast with the
47Full results for all experiments reported in this sub-section are available upon request.
26RR responses in terms of both and speed and magnitude are even more striking than in
the baseline case.
5.2 An alternative lag structure
The 7-variable Eichenbaum and Evans VAR is often estimated using 6 lags of monthly
data rather than 12. In section 3, we noted that 12 lags are required to remove evidence
of residual serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. However, we checked the robustness
of our results to using 6 lags.48 The exchange rate responses to RR remain faster than
those to FF in all six cases. In terms of magnitude, we ﬁnd that at the 12 month horizon
the appreciation of the US$ following a policy contraction is always larger when RR
is the monetary policy measure. At the 48 month horizon, the maximum appreciation
associated with RR exceeds that associated with FF in just three cases: Canada, Japan
and the UK. For France, Germany and Italy, the appreciation associated with FF is
larger. Hence, our ﬁndings concerning the magnitude of exchange rate movements are
less robust than those relating to their speed. However, we stress that our core results
are associated with the more general lag structure and that the restricted lag structure
induces serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals.49
5.3 Sub-sample stability
The ﬁnal robustness test is based on sub-sample regressions. R&R note that during
the early stages of Volcker’s chairmanship of the Federal Reserve, policy was often im-
plemented by targeting quantities (the level of non-borrowed reserves) rather than the
federal funds rate. This experiment lasted until June 1981. Thus, we ﬁt the baseline
VARs for the period 1982:6-1996:12, so that no observations prior to 1981:7 are used in
the estimation. This sub-sample also excludes the turbulent years of the 1970s and a
major outlier in RR in April 1980. The second sub-sample for which we estimate the
48Full results are available upon request.
49Our ﬁndings concerning the speed and magnitude of price and output adjustment in the US, and
foreign interest rate and output adjustment, are robust to varying the lag structure.
27VARs begins at the same time as the core sample and ends in 1992:8. This leads to
the exclusion of the exchange rate crises that saw the pound and lira drop out of the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the bands for the French franc against
the German mark widen.
The key points follow.50 Firstly, both monetary policy measures generate exchange
rate responses which are larger, though not necessarily faster, in the post-1982:6 period
than the pre-1992:8 period.51 Nevertheless, exchange rate responses pre-1992:8 are gen-
erally at least as big as the full sample responses and the main point is that the evidence
for larger responses to RR than to FF is observed in both sub-samples. The same is gen-
erally true of the greater speed of RR eﬀects, though the diﬀerences are less pronounced
than in the full sample for some countries.
Secondly, turning to the results for other macroeconomic variables, US output re-
sponses to RR are sometimes perverse using the post-1982:6 sample – the dominant
response to a policy contraction is higher, rather than lower, output. In contrast, the
pre-1992:8 sample always suggests large recessions in the US following policy contrac-
tions, and this sub-period seems to drive the full sample results suggesting faster and
larger US output eﬀects of RR relative to FF. The use of RR in place of FF resolves
the price puzzle in each of the sub-samples, though the results are stronger for the pre-
1992:8 period. Overall, while the results exhibit some temporal instability, there are no
systematic changes and our main ﬁndings remain intact.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that endogenous and anticipated movements in the federal funds rate
lead to downward bias in the estimated eﬀect of monetary policy on the exchange rate,
potentially explaining the extremely long delays and small magnitudes in the response
50Full results available upon request.
51E.g., in the former period the maximum exchange rate response to RR exceeds 10% when Japan is
the foreign country in the VAR. This is three times the full sample response.
28of bilateral dollar exchange rates to movements in US interest rates that have often been
documented in previous work. To investigate this issue, we used both single equation
and VAR models to estimate the response of six bilateral dollar exchange rates to a new
measure of monetary policy shocks derived by Romer and Romer [2004]. Their monetary
policy measure uses evidence from narrative sources to isolate interest rate movements
that are due to Federal Reserve intentions. These are then orthogonalised with respect to
the Federal Reserve’s forecasts, generating exogenous monetary policy shocks that more
closely match the theoretical deﬁnition of a shock. The results demonstrate that exchange
rate adjustment is generally larger and faster than that associated with the actual federal
funds rate, suggesting that monetary policy exerts a more powerful eﬀect on exchange
rates than has previously been documented. Furthermore, our results from open economy
VARs cast new light on the eﬀects of exogenous monetary policy on other macroeconomic
variables. The reductions in output and prices achieved through a monetary contraction
occur more rapidly than in the closed economy models considered by Romer and Romer
[2004]. This suggests that explicit modelling of open economy aspects of the monetary
transmission mechanism, such as the deﬂationary eﬀects of exchange rate appreciation,
is crucial in accurately identifying the timing and magnitude of the impact of monetary
policy on the US economy.
The results are robust along multiple dimensions. We believe that they are important
for the future direction of theoretical and empirical research in macroeconomics. Models
incorporating sluggishness via methods such as adjustment costs, investor uncertainty,
bounded rationality and/or learning, only need to explain delays in the exchange rate
response on the order of 12 months, rather than the 24-36 months suggested in past
work. Similarly, our ﬁndings concerning price and output adjustment in the United
States suggest that recent theoretical work intended to explain the price puzzle (e.g.,
Barth III and Ramey, 2002), and the inertia in output and inﬂation (e.g., Christiano
et al., 2005), do not have to generate the extremely long lags previously believed. Our
impulse responses also implicitly bound plausible parameter values that may be used in
29calibration exercises. For future empirical work, the striking results obtained by Romer
and Romer [2004] and the parallel open economy results presented here indicate that the
use of narrative evidence and central bank forecasts in deriving monetary policy measures
is likely a fruitful exercise for other countries where researchers wish to estimate the true
eﬀect of monetary policy upon the economy.
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Eichenbaum−Evans (1995) VAR Impulse Response
5
0Table 1:
Country FF/RR Timing Timing
Canada FF 1.789 (2.63) 11 4.600 (2.14) 32
Canada RR 3.269 (2.43) 11 3.697 (1.43) 22
France FF 1.942 (2.25) 9 4.742 (1.51) 48
France RR 3.498 (1.48) 9 9.037 (1.89) 37
Germany FF 1.218 (1.35) 8 3.574 (1.36) 47
Germany RR 3.806 (1.71) 9 8.901 (1.96) 37
Italy FF -0.244 (0.64) 3 -2.376 (1.86) 26
Italy RR 2.920 (1.46) 8 5.558 (1.45) 43
Japan FF -1.095 (2.77) 3 5.843 (2.50) 46
Japan RR 7.104 (2.51) 11 11.030 (2.75) 17
UK FF 1.908 (1.74) 12 6.747 (1.91) 48
UK RR 3.851 (1.32) 11 9.509 (1.65) 48
Maximum response (t-ratio) Maximum response (t-ratio)
Maximum exchange rate responses based on the single equation models
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute change in the US$ within a 12 or 48 month 
interval, following a 100 basis point increase in interest rates. The units are percentage points and 
positive numbers denote appreciation. The t-ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing 
indicates the number of months after which a maximum occurs.
5
1Table 2:
Country FF/RR Timing Timing
Canada FF 0.712 (4.02) 1 0.712 (4.02) 1
Canada RR 1.178 (3.21) 2 1.178 (3.21) 2
France FF 0.984 (2.43) 1 2.202 (2.69) 47
France RR 2.252 (1.59) 9 3.946 (2.51) 21
Germany FF -1.011 (1.26) 12 1.947 (2.85) 48
Germany RR 1.508 (1.10) 9 2.772 (2.13) 17
Italy FF -0.979 (1.19) 12 1.895 (2.16) 48
Italy RR 2.031 (1.54) 9 2.031 (1.54) 9
Japan FF -1.093 (1.35) 11 2.500 (3.55) 28
Japan RR 2.298 (1.37) 9 2.793 (1.49) 17
UK FF 1.326 (2.04) 4 1.326 (2.04) 4
UK RR 2.692 (1.98) 9 2.692 (1.98) 9
Maximum response (t-ratio) Maximum response (t-ratio)
Maximum exchange rate responses based on the VAR models
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute change in the US$ within a 12 or 48 month 
interval, following a 100 basis point increase in interest rates. The units are percentage points and 
positive numbers denote appreciation. The t-ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing 
indicates the number of months after which a maximum occurs.
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2Table 3:
Country TARG/RESIDF Timing Timing
Canada TARG 2.818 (2.53) 12 6.956 (2.25) 33
Canada RESIDF 1.548 (1.77) 12 2.039 (1.33) 23
France TARG 4.254 (2.19) 11 4.625 (0.92) 45
France RESIDF 4.385 (3.76) 9 4.385 (3.76) 9
Germany TARG 1.697 (0.87) 11 4.098 (0.97) 44
Germany RESIDF 3.065 (2.50) 9 3.338 (1.76) 45
Italy TARG 1.663 (1.17) 11 1.977 (1.18) 17
Italy RESIDF 2.170 (1.91) 9 2.170 (1.91) 9
Japan TARG 2.560 (1.63) 12 9.463 (2.62) 46
Japan RESIDF 2.664 (1.56) 12 3.862 (1.95) 17
UK TARG -2.384 (0.95) 4 2.685 (0.68) 40
UK RESIDF 2.556 (2.06) 10 5.004 (2.84) 37
Maximum response Maximum response
Maximum exchange rate responses based on the single equation models
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute change in the US$ within a 12 or 48 month 
interval, following a 100 basis point increase in interest rates. The units are percentage points and 
positive numbers denote appreciation. The t-ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing 
indicates the number of months after which a maximum occurs.
5
3Table 4:
Country TARG/RESIDF Timing Timing
Canada TARG 1.091 (2.86) 4 1.091 (2.86) 4
Canada RESIDF -0.592 (2.30) 12 -0.672 (2.64) 13
France TARG 1.442 (2.30) 1 4.251 (3.33) 43
France RESIDF 1.950 (2.96) 9 2.038 (2.40) 33
Germany TARG 0.876 (0.91) 3 3.659 (3.01) 44
Germany RESIDF 1.041 (1.65) 9 1.220 (2.14) 25
Italy TARG 1.592 (1.86) 3 3.943 (2.53) 46
Italy RESIDF 0.661 (1.27) 9 0.665 (1.09) 40
Japan TARG -1.344 (0.98) 11 4.501 (3.32) 29
Japan RESIDF 1.030 (1.43) 9 1.076 (1.43) 20
UK TARG 2.169 (1.87) 5 2.319 (2.12) 48
UK RESIDF 1.055 (1.87) 10 1.159 (2.64) 25
Maximum response Maximum response
Maximum exchange rate responses based on the VAR models
12 Month Horizon 48 Month Horizon
Notes: Maximum responses refer to the largest absolute change in the US$ within a 12 or 48 month 
interval, following a 100 basis point increase in interest rates. The units are percentage points and 
positive numbers denote appreciation. The t-ratios are calculated using the delta method. Timing 




Sample Periods for Single Equation and VAR Models
Foreign country Single Equation VAR
Canada 1978:2 to 1996:12 1976:1 to 1996:12
France 1974:2 to 1996:12 1972:1 to 1996:12
Germany 1974:2 to 1996:12 1972:1 to 1996:12
Italy 1974:2 to 1996:12 1972:1 to 1996:12
Japan 1974:2 to 1996:12 1972:1 to 1996:12
UK 1975:2 to 1996:12 1973:1 to 1996:12
Table A.2:
Variable Source
Bilateral dollar Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
exchange rates Foreign exchange releases
URL: federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/
US consumer prices International Financial Statistics, line 64 ... ZF
Industrial production International Financial Statistics, line 66 ... CZF
Foreign interest rates International Financial Statistics, line 60B ... ZF
Non-borrowed reserves Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Identifier: TRARR
URL: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/
Total reserves Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Identifier: BOGNONBR
URL: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/
Federal funds rate AER data archive
URL: www.e-aer.org/data
RR monetary policy shocks AER data archive
URL: www.e-aer.org/data




Residual diagnostics for single equation models
Foreign country AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
Canada 0.089 0.356 0.426
France 0.685 1 0.261
Germany 0.284 1 0
Italy 0.188 1 0
Japan 0.987 1 0.075
UK 1 1 0.002
Notes: The figures reported are p-values from the following tests: AR(1-7) is 
an F-test of the hypothesis that the errors are serially uncorrelated at lags 1-
7. Heteroscedasticity is an F-test of unconditional homoscedasticity of the 
errors and Normality a Jarque-Bera test of normality of the errors.
56Table A.4:
Residual diagnostics for VAR models
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.025 0.317 0.084
p
us 0.795 0.452 0.271
y
f 0.617 0.429 0
r
f 0.192 0.241 0
NBRX 0.204 0.248 0
r 0.188 0.064 0
s 0.593 0.875 0.142
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.274 1 0.529
p
us 0.198 1 0
y
f 0.299 1 0
r
f 0.082 1 0
NBRX 0.284 1 0
r 0.332 0.999 0
s 0.075 1 0
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.453 1 0.085
p
us 0.05 0.999 0.039
y
f 0.566 1 0
r
f 0.137 0.893 0
NBRX 0.848 0.999 0
r 0.201 1 0




Notes: The figures reported are p-values from the following tests: AR(1-7) is 
an F-test of the hypothesis that the errors are serially uncorrelated at lags 1-
7. Heteroscedasticity is an F-test of unconditional homoscedasticity in the 
errors and Normality a Jarque-Bera test of normality of the errors.
57Table A.4: continued
Residual diagnostics for VAR models
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.459 1 0.026
p
us 0.23 1 0
y
f 0.288 0.999 0
r
f 0.603 1 0
NBRX 0.188 1 0
r 0.715 1 0
s 0.175 1 0.002
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.938 1 0.04
p
us 0.522 1 0
y
f 0.176 1 0.475
r
f 0.999 1 0
NBRX 0.048 1 0
r 0.737 1 0
s 0.401 0.999 0
Equation AR(1-7) Heteroscedasticity Normality
y
us 0.103 1 0.966
p
us 0.421 1 0
y
f 0.714 1 0
r
f 0.266 1 0
NBRX 0.516 1 0
r 0.384 0.862 0




Notes: The figures reported are p-values from the following tests: AR(1-7) is 
an F-test of the hypothesis that the errors are serially uncorrelated at lags 1-
7. Heteroscedasticity is an F-test of unconditional homoscedasticity in the 
errors and Normality a Jarque-Bera test of normality in the errors.
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